【帕拉格·卡甜心寶貝求包養網納】中國已經登頂了嗎?

中國已經登頂了嗎?

作者:帕拉格·卡納

譯者:吳萬偉

來源:作者授權 儒家網 發布

時間:孔子二五七零年歲次庚子玄月初四日丙申

          耶穌2020年10月20日

 

中國研討了每個年夜國的突起,但它能否遺漏了年夜國式微那一課呢?

 

新加坡—2006年11月,中國公眾全神貫注地觀看12集紀錄片《年夜國突起》。這是由一幫可敬的中國歷史學家參與制作的節目,每集都提醒了世界上包含英國、japan(日本)、俄羅斯和american在內的年夜國登上全球影響力頂峰的突起之路。當時,無論在國內還是國外,中國都被視為亞洲的焦點氣力和未來的超級年夜國,但不是重要的地緣政治故事—尤其在american還處于充足的“超級強國”形式,深深卷進對伊拉克和阿富汗的無限占領。中國人更有來由坐下來認真研討一番那些國家是若何強年夜,并在全球發揮其影響力的。

 

《年夜國突起》實現了它的焦點目標:現在輪到中國突起并登上歷史上超級年夜國的頂峰之路了,這個觀念被社會化和符合法規化了。中國顯然聽從了紀錄片的教訓,這再合適不過:實踐進口替換戰略、強制技術轉讓、積蓄大批外匯儲備、囤積罕見金屬、安排商業艦隊、大舉放貸、在遙遠的處所進行基礎設施建設、樹立強年夜的軍隊、保護供應鏈平安,在殖平易近地或附屬國收買精英等。假如世界歷史是《風險:統治世界的游戲》,每個世紀都要輪流坐莊,由年夜國輪流統治世界的話,現在這個刻度表終于朝著中國傾斜了。

 

或許并非這般。假如歷史真的能夠重復,我們本身都能夠對預測覺得吃驚。不過,這次能夠有所分歧。我們已經積累了太多歷史經驗來預防性地改變歷史的能夠走向。據說東方人崇尚線性思維,而東方人喜歡循環思維。雖然兩者似乎都沒有捉住事物的復雜性,此中每一次的氣力碰撞,每個感化和反感化都能產生分形分叉的結果,它們再通過體系不斷循環并向外逐漸延長。假如中國不是充滿信念地重復過往的輝煌而是錯誤地重蹈現在的窘境,會發生什么情況呢?

 

遺憾的是,中心電視臺并沒有拍攝《年夜國突起》的續集來描寫各個帝國的式微:導致帝國腐敗、顛覆和功虧一簣的意識形態頑固性和戰略錯誤。不過,即使沒有關于帝國大舉擴張和狂妄自豪的正式課程,中國電視臺依然極為詳盡地包養合約一一記錄密集傳播american過往20年中在國際上的胡作非為和國內的衰敗。可是,假如信任本身不會犯錯誤,中國的式微能夠在其突起還沒有完成時候就已經開始了。american已經在疾速從其超級強國的頂峰位置滑落下來,而中國能夠永遠也達不到那樣的巔峰狀態。

 

假如信任本身不會犯錯誤,中國的式微能夠在其突起還沒有完成時候就已經開始了。

 

當這個國家還在積蓄氣力不斷壯年夜之時,就談及“中國峰值”似乎有些太早了。中國的經濟增長已經放緩,但在新冠病毒疫情開始之后,中國成為獨一經濟依然在增長的國家。中國是在疾速老齡包養感情化,但它擁有的年輕人依然比整個歐洲都多,而機器人能夠為本身和包養平台世界生產更多商品。其國內債務像坐了火箭似地向上攀升,但它依然擁有巨額外匯儲備,正在開設資本賬戶并安排全球性的數字加密貨幣。我們應用“峰值”類似于“石油峰值”或“american峰值”:指的是相對值而不是絕對值。“石油峰值”理論的支撐者錯過了龐年夜的額外全球儲蓄這個現實和其他的和可再生動力突起的現實。因為我們已經達到了石油需求的峰值,供應已經變得沒有相關性了。

 

同樣,雖然有交際政策錯誤,無論2020年11月american年夜選的結果假如,american將依然是世界上頭號強國,並且會持續到未來很長一段時間。其經濟仍然龐年夜,它依然把持著世界上獨一靠得住的儲蓄貨幣。其軍事實力可投射到全球任何一個角落,可支撐其全世界的盟國,北美是獨一真正沒有沖突的年夜洲。隨著石油的興起,眾人對american領袖的需求達到頂峰。國家選擇本身的服務供給者,在買家和賣主的全球市場上獲得軍事支援、金融、技術和其他福利。

 

比來之前,年夜部門american人認為,全世界都盼望像american人一樣生涯。到了現在,他們能夠了解本相若何了。比來一些年,鑒于中國的內部活氣和內部積極性,通過一帶一路倡議在全球開始新一波的基礎設施,中國人一向在告訴本身類似的話。可是,就像american通過勸誘盟國傾向于接收違背本身好處的政策,肆意性地強行制裁伊朗和北朝鮮等被國際社會遺棄的國家,阻礙有興趣義的進步而揮霍濫用本身的特權位置一樣,中國也已經很快越過了界線,從獲得他國兄弟般的好心轉向人家持續不斷的懷疑。

 

從喜馬包養行情拉雅山到南中國海,中國不可一世地奪取渺小領土的盡力已經確保三十多億亞洲人能夠再也不信任它了。阿拉伯人、非洲人和拉佳麗正在修正其接納中國債務和項目標水平。而歐盟已經剛剛宣稱中國是“系統性的對手”。中國一向忙于贏得個別戰斗的勝利,卻沒有認識到它能夠正在掉失落整場戰爭。

 

“國家選擇本身的服務供給者,在買家和賣主的全球市場上獲得軍事支援、金融、技術和其他福利。”

 

american和中國都已經過高估計了本身的技術優勢。american將發明和改革混雜起來,疏忽了技術傳播有多么快,並且被競爭的當局和企業多么敏捷地修正和適應海內市場。因特網和基因排序是american最先開發的,但japan(日本)、中國和其他國家已經為本國國民供給最快的寬帶和基因療法了。5G和量子計算也是同樣的情況。

 

中國也錯誤地把市場優勢當作壟斷。可是,華為被多國協同驅逐出關鍵的基礎設施網絡市場—諸如彈性供應鏈倡議之類盡力來安慰japan(日本)、澳年夜利亞、印度和其他國家在半導體、醫藥、稀土礦產和汽車零部件等的產業潛能—一切這些都展現出其安排性優勢能多么快地被耗費失落。當american支撐的印度公司供給的人工智能服務是第三方供給的年夜數據剖析、機器學習和其他統計東西給客戶,無需年夜規模的自我導航投資,也沒有包養意思附加條件時,為什么要和獲取你數據的中國公司一起配合?歷史上最不成防止的氣力不是帝國的循環而是技術疏散。

 

同樣事理,當當代界的重要特征更多是地緣政治的無序狀態而不是集中。歐洲已經作為金融、交際、和治理權威的獨立一極而出現。遠非沮喪地接收在american和中國兩極的“新冷戰”中低人一等的位置,歐盟越來越明顯地要依照本身的方法與俄羅斯和伊朗打交道。“歐盟-亞洲聯結倡議”是比american想出的任何東西更公道得多的歐亞接觸途徑,歐洲與亞洲的貿易和投資紐帶很快能夠比american紐帶多一倍。

 

在亞洲內部的互動也很快達讓中國版的american“單極時刻”走到終點。japan(日本)已經開啟了戰略復興,印度充滿信念地回避中國在喜瑪拉雅多個劇場的運作;就算新明朝的“珠寶艦隊”年夜軍也最基礎無法把持印度洋。與american和澳年夜利亞一路,這些印太國家已經組成戰略“四國聯盟”來為中國的強大鄰國供給支撐,以對抗中國的擴張。明天的弱國盼望主權和自我實現,但不是新商業附屬國位置,強年夜的性命線已經出現來確保他們依然在從前的途徑上而非屈從于后者。

 

當當代界的重要特征更多是地緣政治的無序狀態而不是集中。

 

無序狀態是復雜體系的內在特征:權力冷淡無情地疏散。我們從來沒有像現在這樣有全球性的權力分派:21世紀是人類歷史上第一次存在每個洲或地區都代表本身權力的獨立一極。這種復雜的全球體系比任何單一權力都更宏大:在其關系網絡中,任何一個國家都不克不及將意志強加于人而不引發其他國家組成聯盟與其對抗。權力總存在邊界,但無序狀態能夠沒有盡頭。

 

生齒學特征和心思變化也是顯著的變量,推動我們走向未來的非循環切線。自從1945年以來,全球生齒已包養網推薦經增長了三倍,聯合國承認的國家數量達到193個,將近翻了兩番。大批生齒生涯在后殖平易近主義國家,他們對殖平易近主義和冷戰都有不高興的記憶。他們不盼望歷史重演,也不會允許歷史重演。本來能夠需求幾十年或許幾個世紀才幹構成的反中國的反沖感化在過往3年時間里居然變成了現實。2020年將供給一個無情沖擊,讓人從2010年的“中國夢”中醒來。

 

一切這些都暗示當今的傳統聰明---american應用這個聰明恢復其霸主位置或中國取而代之,而世界其他處所自願在中美新冷戰中選邊站---代表了想象力的顯著缺少。不過,我們比來的思惟缺點能夠具有教導意義,教給我們世界政治新動態變化的教訓。加倍陳舊的和越來越過時的學術傳統從簡單性中尋找撫慰,將理論的吝嗇和蹩腳偽裝成嚴謹性。

 

不僅東方學者受其歷史形式的誘惑,具有諷刺意味的是,中國學者也是這般。畢竟,假如從北京的視角來看,假如不像東方當局那樣告訴你現在輪到你們統治世界了,會怎么樣呢?媒體一向在火燒眉毛地擁抱“修昔底德圈套”,似乎american哈佛年夜學肯尼迪學院貝爾福科學與國際事務中間的主任格雷厄姆·艾利森(Graham Alli女大生包養俱樂部son)的偉年夜著作《注定走向戰爭:中美能擺脫修昔底德圈套》的副標題中并沒有問號。

 

21世紀是人類歷史上第一次在每個洲或地區都有代表本身權力的獨立一極。

 

可是,實際上已經公開流露的,體現了疾速反饋就自然地存在于復雜的全球體系中:夸張地襯著中國威脅已經激發出針對那種威脅的回應,惹起地緣政治沿著新的矢量移動。有關全球生齒,類似的現象已經在出現:世界生齒達到150億,將世界墮入馬爾薩斯式無當局狀態的恐懼乞助于廣泛的辦法來把持生齒的瘋狂增長。現有的估計暗示全世界的生齒將在2050年達到100億人。

 

人們不由得想反對墮入這種宿命論。它已經被(市場消化了信息而)給出相應價格。就像克里斯托弗·諾蘭(Christopher Nolan)的科幻電影《信條》和亞歷克斯·加蘭(Alex Garland)的略微更不難懂得的渺小系列《開拓者》(Devs),確認不受拘束意志是戲劇頂峰的元素,但更多是我們無法迴避的重要情節的干擾(想象在《開拓者》中最后的電梯場景或許貓和老鼠,或肯尼思·布拉納(Kenneth Branagh)飾演的俄國軍火商安德烈(Andrei)和《信條》中約翰·年夜衛·華盛頓(John David Washington)飾演的配角。)至多在科幻小說中,未來與現在交通,供給了依據其信息行動的顯著安慰。在現實生涯中,我們維持一種把持的幻覺,將最蹩腳場景放置在我們思惟的某個角落。

 

新冠疫情已經是悲慘的提示,它讓我們意識到這個錯誤的心思狀態。當災難降臨的時候,世界上的一切先見之明都沒有多年夜意義。雖然科學家正告過病毒在全球傳播的指數級增長速率,平易近兵組織占領帝國年夜廈請求終止封城隔離辦法,他們從來就沒有真正嚴肅地對待這些正告。因為沒有對過往疫情的機構性記憶,東方社會年夜部門人沒有能汲取1918年西班牙流感的簡單教訓:居家隔離和戴口罩。同樣,過渡期誠信項目(Transition Integrity Project)模擬了american年夜選結果引發爭議的場景,以便采取包養網ppt步驟預防能夠出現的分崩離析,但意識形態不合和我們沒有才能采取集體行動都只能確保那些場景無論若何都能夠出現。

 

災難性戰爭的地緣政治循環難道不會同樣出現嗎?我們或許宣稱擁有先見之明來建議中國接收現實,american在挑起戰爭之前疏忽的現實,戰爭能夠類似地減弱其十分困難贏得的突起進程。可是,假如中國實際上想要這些戰爭作為其宏偉計劃的組成部門呢?其實,另一個擔憂來自現在:特朗普當局顯著晉陞american與臺灣交際和軍事紐帶的做法--加下限制臺灣半導體制造公司向中國年夜陸出售半導體產品的制裁辦法---被認為是拆解盟國向中國年夜陸供給產品的供應鏈,台灣包養網但這些辦法能夠加速中國推進其武統臺灣的規劃,實際占領這些關鍵零部件生產基地。本來旨在打殘中國高科技產業的戰略反過來能夠晉陞了它的產業才能,推動中國在戰場上占據安排位置的才能。

 

本來能夠需求幾十年或許幾個世紀才幹構成的反中國的反沖感化在過往3年的時間里就變成了現實。

 

雖然這般,即便中國預先考慮到未來行動的兩個步驟,它能否考慮未來的三步或四步呢?我覺得有些懷疑。中國雖然機敏靈巧,但并非無所不知無所不克不包養意思及。它能夠通過加倍“戰爭的突起”扭轉現在/未來的順從/反沖來適應本身的野心,但習近平主席的平易近族主義劫持了這個國家。這是歷史上的絕妙情節難以迴避的樞紐?或許。可是,中國不是第一個將發展勢頭當成永遠特征的國家。平易近族主義和必勝主義都預示著沖突的極年夜能夠性---其后續影響未必對中國有利。

 

現在需求來自未來的更多聲音。假如沒有了《信條》中的“包養網車馬費時間鉗形攻勢”,我們確定不斷遭受場景并延長出途徑來防止最壞結果的出現。在1983年的熱門電影《戰爭游戲》中,戰爭操縱計劃響應系統(WOPR)模擬循環了每一次能夠的核戰爭場景,并意識到它們最終都導致僵局,發出的感歎很是著名,“一場怪異的游戲:獨一的贏家就是不開啟戰爭。”假如歷史是事前已經編程完畢的算法,我們獨一的盼望是維持自我治理自生系統的集體意志。我們與祖先有危險數量的配合性:驕傲、恐懼和貪婪。但真正主要的是其他一些東西:威懾、主權、配合的氣候威脅等等。現在到了吹出分歧哨音的時候。

 

作者簡介:

 

帕拉格·卡納(Parag Khanna),以數據和場景為基礎的戰略顧問公司“未來地圖”創始人和經理合伙人,最新著作是《未來在亞洲:21世紀的商業、沖突和文明》(2019)。本文的英文原稿發表在“Noemamag”雜志上。

 

譯自:Has China Peaked Already?By Parag Khanna October 13,2020
 
https://www.noemamag.com/has-china-peaked-already/?utm_source=sendinblue&utm_campaign=Motherload__PKcom___Noema&utm_medium=email
 
Has China Peaked Already?
 
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By Parag Khanna October 13,2020
 
Parag Khanna is the founder and managing partner of FutureMap,a data and scenario-based strategic advisory firm.His latest book is“The Future is Asian:Commerce,Conflict and Culture in the 21st Century.”
 
SINGAPORE—In November 2006,the Chinese public was held rapt by a 12-part documentary series titled“The Rise of the Great Powers.”Curated by a team of respected Chinese historians,each episode revealed the pathways major empires took to reach the zenith of their global influence,including th包養一個月e United Kingdom,Japan,Russia and the United States.At the time,China was viewed—both at home and abroad—as Asia’s central force and a future superpower,but not the main geopolitical story—especially as the U.S.was in full“hyper-power”mode,deep into its indefinite occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan.This was all the more reason for the Chinese to sit back and cautiously study how nations could become so powerful as to extend their might all across the planet.
 
“The Rise of the Great Powers”achieved its central objective:to socialize and legitimize the notion that it was China’s turn to rise into the pantheon of history’s superpowers.And China has clearly f包養軟體ollowed the documentary’s lessons to a tee:practice import substitution,force technology transfer,amass currency reserves,hoard precious metals,deploy merchant fleets,lend prodigiously,install in包養價格frastructure far and wide,build a powerful military,protect your supply chains,buy off elites in colonies and client states,and so forth.If world history were a game of Risk,then every century,the board is reset and another player gets its turn to rule the world.The scale is finally weighted in China’s favor.
 
Or maybe not.If history really did repeat itself,we’d marvel at our own predictability.But this time could also be very different.We have amassed enough history to preventively alter the course history seems to be taking us on.It is said that Westerners reason in 包養女人linear terms and Easterners in circular concepts.Neither though seems to grasp complexity,in which every collision of forces,every action and reaction,produces fractal outcomes that recirculate and ripple through the system.What if,rather than confidently repeating the past,China is mistakenly repeating the present?
 
CCTV unfortunately never produced a sequel on imperial decline:the ideological rigidity and strategic blunders that cor包養一個月rupted,subverted and undermined the success of empires.But even without a formal curriculum on imperial overstretch and hubris,Chinese TV has beamed home blow by blow America’s past two decades of international flailing and domestic decay.Yet convinced it can do no wrong,China’s decline may have begun before its rise is complete.America has quickly fallen from its hyper-power apex.China may well never reach it.
 
“Convinced it can do no wrong,China’s decline may have begun before its rise is complete.”
 
It seems premature to speak of“peak China”when the country is still going from strength to strength.Growth has slowed,but in the wake of COVID-19,it is the only economy growing at all.It is rapidly aging,but still has more youth than Europe has people,while robots churn out enough goods for itself and the world.Its domestic debt has skyrocketed,but it still has enormous reserves,is opening its capital account and deploying a global cryptocurrency.But the sense in which to use“peak”is akin to“peak oil”or“peak America”:relative,not absolute.Proponents of“peak oil”missed the reality of vast additional global reserves as well as the phenomenal rise of alternative and renewable energy.Because we have reached peak oil demand,supply has become irrele包養情婦vant.
 
Similarly,despite foreign policy blunders and irrespective of the November 2020 election,America will remain the world’s preeminent power long into the future.Its economy is gargantuan,and it controls the world’s only reliable reserve currency.Its military has global reach a包養網VIPnd can reinforce allies across the globe,and North America is the only truly conflict-free continent.Yet as with oil,the demand for American leadership has peaked.Countries choose their service provide包養犯法嗎rs for military assistance,financing,technology and other utilities from a global marketplace of suitors and vendors.
 
Until recently,most Americans thought the world wanted to be like them.By now,they probably know better.In recent years,the Chinese have been telling themselves similar things,given the country’s internal dynamism and external activism in building a new layer of global infrastructure through its Belt and Road Initiative.But much as America has abused its privileged status by cajoling allies toward policies counter to their own interests and imposing wanton sanctions that inhibit meaningful progress in rehabilitating pariah states such as Iran and North Korea,China has very quickly crossed the line from receiving fraternal goodwill to permanent suspicion.
 
From the Himalayas to the South China Sea,its aggressive pursuit of micro-territories has ensured that more than three billion Asians may never trust it again.Arabs,Africans and Latin Americans are trimming their exposure to Chinese debt and projects.For its part,the European Union has just declared China a“systemic rival.”China has been so busy winnin包養管道g battles that it doesn’t realize it may already have lost the war.
 
“Countries choose their service providers for military assistance,financing,technology and other utilities from a global marketplace of suitors and vendors.”
 
Both America and China have also overestimated their technological superiority.The U.S.has conflated invention with innovation,overlooking how rapidly technologies spread and are adapted to foreign markets by rival governments and their firms.The Internet and gene sequencing were pioneered in the U.S.,but Japan,China and others have delivered the fastest bandwidth and gene therapies to their citizens.The same goes for 5G and quantum computing.
 
China too has mistaken market prowess for monopoly.But the coordinated ejection of Huawei from critical infrastructure networks—and efforts such as the Resilient Supply Chain Initiative to boost the industrial capacity of countries such as Japan,Australia,India and others in semiconductors,pharmaceuticals,rare earth minerals and automobile parts—demonstrate how quickly dominance can be eroded.Why go with Chinese companies that harvest your data when U.S.-backed Indian firms offer AI-as-a-service is a third-party provision of big data analysis,machine learning and other statistical tools to clients without the need for large self-directed investment.,with no strings attached?The most inevitable force in history is not imperial cycles but technological diffusion.
 
In the same vein,today’s world is far more characterized by geopolitical entropy than concentration.Europe has emerged as an independent pole of financial,diplomatic and regulatory authority.Far from despondently accepting junior status in a U.S.-China bipolar“new Cold War,”it is increasingly going its own way in dealing with Russia and Iran.The“EU-Asia Connectivity Initiative”is a far more sensible approach to Euras包養留言板ian engagement than anything the U.S.has come up with,and European trade and investment ties with Asia could soon be double America’s.
 
Dynamics within Asia itself are also hastily bringing an end to China’s version of America’s“unipolar moment.”Japan has mounted a strategic revival,and India is confidently parrying Chinese maneuvers in multiple Himalayan theaters;even a neo-Ming armada of“treasure fleets”will never control the Indian Ocean.Together with the U.S.and Australia,these Indo-Pacific powers have formed a strategic“Quad”to fortify the defenses of China’s weaker neighbors to limit Chinese 包養女人expansionism.Today’s weak states aspire to sovereignty and self-actualization,not neo-mercantile subservience,and strong lifelines have包養網dcard emerged to ensure they remain on the former path rather than succumbing to the latter.
 
“Today’s world is far more characterized by geopolitical entropy than concentration.”
 
Entropy is inherent in complex systems:Power inexorably diffuses.Never before have we had such a global distribution of power:The 21st century is the first time in human history that every continent or region represents independent poles of power in their own right.This complex global system is far greater than any single power:Within its webs of relationships,no power can impose itself on the world without counter-coalitions forming.There are limits to power,but no end to entropy.
 
Demographics and psychology are also significant variables nudging us toward a non-cyclical tangent for the future.Since 1945,the global population has more than tripled and the number of states recognized by the U.N.has nearly quadrupled to 193.The vast majority of the human population lives in post-colonial countries with unhappy memories of both colonialism and the Cold War;they do not wish for history to repeat itself—and will not let it.The backlash against China that has materialized in just the past three years would have taken decades,centuries ago.The 2020s will provide a rude awakening from the“Chinese Dream”of the 2010s.
 
All of this suggests that today’s conventional wisdom—by which either the U.S.restores its primacy or China displaces it while the rest of the world is forced to choose sides in a new Cold War—represents a fairly spectacular failure of imagination.Nonetheless,our recent intellectual shortcomings can be instructive in teaching lessons in the emerging dynamics of world politics.An older and increasingly out-of-date scholarly tradition takes comfort in simplicity,with t包養甜心網heoretical parsimony masquerading as rigor.
 
Not only have Western academics been seduced by their historical models but ironically,so too were the Chinese.After all,from Beijing’s perspective,what is not to like about Western authorities telling you it is your turn to rule the world?The media has been all too eager to embrace the“Thucydides Trap,”as if Graham Allison’s great book“Destined for War:Can America and China Escape Thucydides’Trap?”did not contain a question mark in the subtitle.
 
“The 21st century is the first time in human history that every continent or region represents independent poles of power in their own right.”
 
What has actually transpired,however,embodies the rapid feedback loops inherent in a complex global system:Hyping th包養平台e China threat has inspired myriad responses to that threat,shifting geopolitics along new vectors.A similar phenomenon has been underway with respect to the glob包養女人al population:Fears that the world population would reach fifteen billion and plunge the world into Malthusian anarchy evoked widespread measures to control rampant population growth.Current estimates suggest the human population will reach包養合約 about 10 billion people in 2050.
 
There is a tempting objection to this drift from fatalism:It’s all priced in already.Like Christopher Nolan’s film“Tenet”or Alex Garland’s sli包養甜心網ghtly more comprehensible miniseries“Devs,”asserting free will is an element of the dramatic apotheosis,but merely a distraction from the master plot we cannot escape(think of the final elevator scene in“Devs”or the cat-and-mouse between Kenneth Branagh’s Andrei and John David Washington’s Protagonist in“Tenet”).In sci-fi at least,the future communicates with the present,providing a stark incentive to act on its message.In real life,we maintain the illusion of control and consign the worst-case scenario to a corner of our mind.
 
The pandemic has been a tragic reminder of this default mental state:All the foresight in the world meant very little when it struck.While scientists warned of its exponential global spread,militias occupied state capitol buildings demanding an end to lockdowns they never took seriously in the first place.With no institutional memory of past pandemics,most Western societies failed to heed the simple lesson of the 1918 Spanish flu:Stay at home and wear a mask.Similarly,the Transition Integrity Project ran scenarios of disputed U.S.election outcomes so that steps could be taken to prevent chaos,but ideolog包養站長ical division and our incapacity for collective action all but ensure that one of those scenarios will come to pass anyway.
 
Isn’t it just the same with geopolitical cycles of cataclysmic wars?We may claim to have the foresight to advise China to accept realities America ignored prior to provoking wars that will similarly erode its hard-won ascent—but what if China actually wants these wars as part of its master plan?Indeed,another worrying example from the present:The Trump administration’s overt upgrading of diplomatic and military ties with Taiwan—combined with sanctions banning the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company from selling semiconductors to China—are meant to disentangle allied countries’supply chains from the Chinese mainland,yet they could very well be accelerating China’s plans to invade Taiwan and physically capture the production of these critical components.A strategy designed to cripple China’s high-tech industries would perversely enhance them,boosting China’s ability to dominate the battlespace.
 
“The backlash against China that has materialized in just the past three years would have taken decades,centuries ago.”
 
Still,even if China has thought two steps ahead,has it thought three or four?I have my doubts.China is nimble but not omniscient.It could have av包養價格erted the present(and future)pushback to its ambitions through a more“peaceful rise,”but President Xi Jinping’s nationalism hijacked the country instead.An inescapable pivot in history’s master plot?Perhaps.But China would not be the first power to confuse its momentum for longevity.Both nationalism and triumphalism indicate a high likelihood of conflict—but not that its aftermath will necessarily favor China.
 
The present needs more voices from the future.Absent the“temporal pincer movements”of“Tenet,”we must constantly run scenarios and derive pathways to avoid the worst outcomes.In the 1983 hit film WarGames,the War Operation Plan Response simulator cycles through every possible nuclear war scenario and upon realizing they all end in stalemate,famously utters:“A strange game.:the only winning move is not to pla包養甜心y.”If history is a pre-programmed algorithm,our only hope is a collective will to maintain a self-regulating autopoiesis.We have a dangerous amount still in common with our forefathers:pride,fear and greed.But what is different should matter more:deterrence,sovereignty,a common climate threat and more.It’s time to whistle a different tune.
 
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